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SORTING OUT THE SHOOTOUT: FLORIDA COURTS UNTANGLE THE
“STAND YOUR GROUND LAW”
Lawrence J. Semento*
INTRODUCTION
In February 2008, Gabriel Mobley finished work at his pressure cleaning
business and, after going home to shower and change, went to the office of his high
school friend, Jose “Chico” Correa.1 After working several hours at Chico’s tax
preparation business, Mobley joined Chico and his staff at a local Chili’s to
unwind.2 Mobley drove his own car to the restaurant.3 When he arrived, he
removed the handgun he had been carrying and stowed it in the glove
compartment.4 Mobley had a concealed weapons permit, but left the gun in the car
because he believed he could not carry it into a restaurant.5 By the time Mobley
entered the restaurant, several of Chico’s female employees were sitting in a booth,
so Mobley joined Chico and another male employee at the bar nearest the booth.6
After food and drinks were ordered, Mobley and Chico went outside to smoke.7
They returned to the bar and ate, drank, and conversed.8 Mobley and Chico then
went outside to smoke a second time.9 When they returned inside, they found two
men, Jason Gonzalez and Rolando “Roly” Carrazana, talking with the female
employees at the booth.10 Chico believed that the women were uncomfortable, so
he asked the men to leave.11 A verbal altercation ensued, which ended when the
men returned to their own table at the opposite end of the bar.12 Overhearing the
brief altercation, the restaurant manager asked the security guard to keep watch on
Jason and Roly.13
________________________
*
Circuit Judge, 5th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Florida. J.D., University of Florida College of Law.
B.A., University of South Carolina. Judge Semento has been a circuit judge since 2002, and he serves as Chief
Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit Appellate Division. Judge Semento has served as an Associate Judge on the
Fifth District Court of Appeal. He was in the private practice of law for twenty years prior to appointment to the
bench.
1.
Mobley v. State, 132 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1162.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1162.
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Mobley was not involved in the argument.14 Instead, he acted as a peacekeeper,
and went to Jason’s and Roly’s table to ask them to forget the petty incident.15 He
shook Jason’s hand.16 Mobley felt uncomfortable, however, when he later saw
Roly staring at Chico’s group with a mean look on his face.17 Mobley decided to
leave, but before doing so, went into the restroom with Chico where he expressed
his concerns.18 When exiting the restroom, Mobley saw Jason, with Roly outside,
banging aggressively on the restaurant window and pointing at them.19 Mobley
suggested that once Jason and Roly left the area, they should all go home.20
Mobley left Chili’s about ten to fifteen minutes later, when it appeared that Jason
and Roly were gone.21
Mobley, wearing a sleeveless t-shirt, went to his vehicle, which was parked
near the front door.22 At his vehicle, he put on a sweatshirt because it was cold.23
He retrieved his handgun and placed it in a holster on his waist.24 Within a minute
after Mobley left the restaurant, Chico and one of his other employees walked
out.25 Mobley joined them and they walked to Chico’s vehicle, which was parked
nearby.26 Mobley and Chico stepped onto the sidewalk and smoked cigarettes.27 A
few seconds after they stepped onto the sidewalk, Jason rapidly approached and
delivered a vicious punch to Chico’s face, which fractured his eye socket.28 Jason
danced back with fists raised, then quickly advanced toward Mobley.29 Mobley
reacted by raising his arm to fend off Jason.30 As Jason stepped back, Roly came
running toward Mobley and Chico from the back of the restaurant.31 Roly neared
Jason, who was only a few feet from Mobley and Chico.32 Mobley feared a new
attack, and saw Roly reach under his long, baggy shirt for what he believed to be a
weapon.33 Mobley drew his gun, and shot at Roly.34 The shots hit both Roly and
Jason.35
Jason turned to flee, but collapsed.36 He died of a gunshot wound to the chest.37
Roly, hit four times, fell near the entrance to the restaurant.38 He later died from the
________________________
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id.
Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1163.
Id.
Id. at 1163–64.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id.
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gunshot wounds.39 Two knives were found on the ground near where Roly fell, but
no weapon was located on his body.40
Gabriel Mobley’s journey through the legal system would follow a
significantly different path than those who traveled it before 2005. Amid some
controversy, Florida became the first state to radically revamp its self-defense
laws.41 In 2005, Governor Jeb Bush signed into law Florida’s “Stand Your Ground
Law.”42 The smoldering controversy surrounding the enactment of the law burst
ablaze when Trayvon Martin was killed.43 The new legislation substantially
changed existing self-defense laws, both substantively and procedurally.
Prior to 2005, Florida law permitted the use of deadly force in self-defense
only if one reasonably believed that it was necessary to prevent imminent death or
great bodily harm.44 Even in those situations, a person must use reasonable means
to avoid the danger, including retreat.45 However, when a person claims selfdefense in his or her own home, an exception to the common law duty to retreat
applies.46 This privilege of non-retreat from the home is known as the “castle
doctrine.”47 Florida law allowed one charged with a crime involving force to raise
self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial.48 Whether a person is justified in the
use of deadly force in self-defense is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.49
If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of self-defense, then the burden shifts
to the State to overcome the defense.50 The State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.51

37.
Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1164.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
See, e.g., Florida Legislation—The Controversy over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law—FLA.
STAT. § 776.013 (2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 351–53 (2005) [hereinafter The Controversy]; Jennifer
Randolph, Comment, How to Get Away with Murder: Criminal and Civil Immunity Provisions in “Stand Your
Ground” Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 614 (2014) (“The Florida legislature was the first to pass a
comprehensive update of its self-defense law . . . but it was most certainly not the last. . . . Since 2005, more than
half of the states have enacted or considered similar legislation to Florida’s statute.”).
42.
Zachary L. Weaver, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for
Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2008) (noting that Jeb Bush signed the Florida’s “Stand Your Ground”
Law in 2005). In this article, the term “Stand Your Ground Law” is used to refer to the legislation that amended or
modified Florida’s self-defense laws, as codified in sections 776.012, 776.013, and 776.032, of the Florida
Statutes. See The Controversy, supra note 41, at 352 n.173.
43.
Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing:
The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
271, 271–73 (2012).
44.
FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2004) (amended 2014); see Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).
45.
Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 1049–50 (“[W]hen one is violently assaulted in his own house or immediately surrounding
premises, he is not obliged to retreat but may stand his ground and use such force as prudence and caution would
dictate as necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm.” (quoting Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla.
1965))).
48.
Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049.
49.
Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
50.
State v. Rivera, 719 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
51.
Brown v. State, 454 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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The Stand Your Ground Law significantly changed Florida’s self-defense laws.
Most notably, it eliminated the duty to retreat in most instances.52 It also
established a presumption that force was used reasonably where a defendant is
faced with an intruder in a home or occupied vehicle.53 Further, it enlarged a
person’s right to avoid civil or criminal consequences for the use of force,
including deadly force.54 Perhaps this change is the most radical from prior selfdefense law.
Since the enactment of these revisions to Florida’s self-defense laws, Florida
courts have undertaken the task of interpreting and implementing the statutes.
There has been confusion as to the proper procedures to follow. “Despite section
776.032’s broad temporal application, running from before arrest through trial,
there is no legislative guidance as to the statute’s implementation.”55 This article
will review and analyze those cases, particularly focusing on issues concerning (1)
immunity from prosecution in both civil and criminal cases; (2) pretrial immunity
hearings; (3) unlawful activities precluding the defense; (4) self-defense jury
instructions; and (5) appropriate procedures for appeal. Understanding the changes
in Florida’s self-defense laws is vitally important for law enforcement officers,
defendants, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges. This article is intended to
provide a better understanding of the law as currently interpreted and implemented
by the courts.
I. IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
An individual who uses justifiable force is immune from both civil action and
criminal prosecution.56 Section 776.032 provides that “[a] person who uses or
threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is
justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action
for the use or threatened use of such force . . . .”57 As mentioned above, section
776.012, as revised in 2005, permits a person to use non-deadly force against
another when the person reasonably believes it is necessary to defend against the
use of unlawful force.58 It allows the use of deadly force without a duty to retreat if
a person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death
or great bodily harm or the commission of a forcible felony.59 Section 776.013, as
enacted in 2005, creates a presumption that a person held a reasonable fear of
imminent peril of death or great bodily harm when using deadly force to defend
________________________
52.
FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1), (2) (2013) (amended 2014).
53.
FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013) (amended 2014).
54.
FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014).
55.
Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The court went on to say: “Thus far, two
other district courts have examined the issues presented by the statute and have reached differing results regarding
the proper procedures to follow.” Id.
56.
Id.
57.
§ 776.032(1).
58.
FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (amended 2014).
59.
Id. at (2).
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against another while in a residence or vehicle.60 The presumption does not apply
in certain instances. For example, one who is engaged in a criminal activity may
not avail himself of the presumption.61 Section 776.013(3) expands the “castle
doctrine”62:
A person who is attacked in his or her dwelling, residence, or
vehicle has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her
ground and use or threaten to use force, including deadly force, if
he or she uses or threatens to use force in accordance with §
776.012(1) or (2) or § 776.031(1) or (2).63
Although the Stand Your Ground Law creates immunity, the proper procedures
for one to seek the immunity are not specified. Since the enactment of the Law,
Florida courts have considered this issue. The First District Court of Appeal of
Florida was one of the first to do so.64 In Peterson v. State, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the information based on his claim of immunity from
prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law.65 The State argued that the motion
should have been filed as a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.190(c)(4).66 Thus, the State asserted, any factual dispute would defeat
the motion.67 However, noting an absence of procedure for handling immunity
claims in Florida, the First District followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Colorado,68 and held that a defendant may raise the issue of statutory immunity
pretrial and when such a claim is raised, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that immunity attaches.69
The court noted that this is a similar burden placed on a defendant for motions
challenging the voluntariness of confessions.70 The Second,71 Third,72 and Fifth
Districts followed Peterson.73
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida reached a different
result. In Velasquez v. State, the court found that when a motion to dismiss is used
________________________
60.
FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013) (amended 2014).
61.
Id. at (2)(c).
62.
“The privilege of nonretreat from the home, part of the ‘castle doctrine,’ has early common law
origins.” Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999) (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d
724, 725 (Fla. 1982); Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965); Pell v. State, 97 Fla. 650, 665 (1929);
Danford v. State, 53 Fla. 4, 13 (1907); People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 240 (1914)).
63.
FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended 2014).
64.
See Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
65.
Id.
66.
Id. This is commonly called a “C-4 motion.” See, e.g., State v. Purvis, 560 So. 2d 1296, 1297 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
67.
Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29. A court is not permitted to make factual determinations in considering a “C4 motion.” Clark v. State, 993 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). See generally FLA. R. C. P. 3.190
(c)(4).
68.
Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29 (citing People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 981–82 (Colo. 1987).
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 838, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
72.
State v. Yaqubie, 51 So. 3d 474, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
73.
Gray v. State, 13 So. 3d 114, 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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to seek immunity from prosecution, the rule of procedure provides the framework
for the court to make its determination.74 If there are factual issues, the motion to
dismiss must be denied.75
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved this conflict in 2010.76 The court in
Dennis v. State framed the issue: “In this case we consider whether a trial court
should conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing and resolve issues of fact when ruling
on a motion to dismiss asserting immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to
section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2006), commonly known as the ‘Stand Your
Ground’ statute.”77 The court noted that Florida law has long recognized a
defendant’s right to assert by affirmative defense that the use of force was
justified.78 However, this statute grants defendants “a substantive right to not be
arrested, detained, charged, or prosecuted as a result of the use of legally justified
force.”79 Following the reasoning of Peterson, the court concluded that when a
defendant files a motion to dismiss on the basis of the statutory immunity, the trial
court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve any factual issues80:
We conclude that where a criminal defendant files a motion to
dismiss pursuant to section 776.032, the trial court should decide
the factual question of the . . . statutory immunity. A motion to
dismiss on the basis of section 776.032 immunity is not subject to
the requirements of rule 3.190(c)(4) but instead should be treated
as a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.190(b).81
Another procedural issue concerns the timing of the immunity hearing.82 That
issue was addressed in Martinez v. State.83 Seven weeks prior to his second-degree
murder trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion seeking
immunity under the Stand Your Ground Law, and demanded a pretrial hearing.84
________________________
74.
Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
75.
Id.
76.
Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 458 (Fla. 2010).
77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 462.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 464.
81.
Id. Rule 3.190(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: “All defenses available to a
defendant by plea, other than not guilty, shall be made only by motion to dismiss the indictment or information,
whether the same shall relate to matters of form, substance, former acquittal, former jeopardy, or any other
defense.” FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b).
82.
Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
By defining “criminal prosecution” to include the arrest, detention, charging, or prosecution
of the defendant, the statute allows for an immunity determination at any stage of the
proceeding. . . . [T]he statute authorized the immunity determination to be made by law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries. In enacting the statute, however, the
legislature did not restrict the time frame for determining immunity, but rather provided a
time continuum stretching across the entire criminal process.
Id.
83.
84.

Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Id.
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Determining that there was insufficient time to hear the motions prior to trial, the
lower court did not hold a pretrial hearing and decided to conduct the hearing
during the trial.85 The appellate court held that when a motion seeking immunity is
filed well in advance of trial, the proper procedure is for the court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing prior to the trial, and the failure to do so “operates to deprive a
defendant of at least some measure of the ‘true’ immunity contemplated by
legislature.”86
In Martinez, the State offered what may be a very legitimate concern; a
defendant could abuse the process by withholding a claim to immunity until such
time as it may garner a procedural or substantive advantage.87 However, the court
found there was no evidence that the defendant had done so in this case.88
The courts have also addressed the issue of the burden of proof on a motion to
dismiss filed under section 776.032.89 In Peterson v. State, the court, noting the
absence of procedures for implementation of the statute, held that it is the
defendant’s burden to prove entitlement to immunity from prosecution by a
preponderance of the evidence.90 Although not a dispositive issue in the case, by
approving the procedures set out in Peterson v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida
seems to agree.91
A recent case from the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida, Bretherick v.
State, squarely addressed this issue.92 There, the defendant believed he was
threatened by another motorist on a busy highway.93 When the other motorist
stopped in front of his vehicle, the defendant pointed a firearm at the driver and
held him at gunpoint.94 The defendant was charged with aggravated assault.95 He
filed a motion to dismiss based on the self-defense immunity from prosecution.96
After conducting a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion.97
The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court improperly placed the
burden on him.98 Although affirming the denial of his motion, the appellate court
addressed the burden of proof: “The issue of who bears the burden of proof may
well be significant where the case is an extremely close one, or where only limited
________________________
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 1221.
88.
Id.
89.
See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). This is not to be confused with
the burden of proof on an affirmative defense of self-defense. In that instance, it is well established that a
defendant claiming self-defense bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of self-defense. Once that
is accomplished, the burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in
self-defense. Leasure v. State, 105 So. 3d 5, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). See generally FLA. STAT. § 776.032
(2013) (amended 2014).
90.
Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29.
91.
Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010).
92.
Bretherick v. State,135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
93.
Id. at 338.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Bretherick, 135 So. 3d at 340.
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evidence is presented for the trial court’s consideration.”99 The court certified the
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: “ONCE THE DEFENSE
SATISFIES THE INITIAL BURDEN OF RAISING THE ISSUE, DOES THE
STATE HAVE THE BURDEN OF DISPROVING A DEFENDANT’S
ENTITLEMENT TO SELF-DEFENSE IMMUNITY AT A PRETRIAL
HEARING AS IT DOES AT TRIAL?”100
The Supreme Court of Florida has accepted jurisdiction.101 A decision has not
yet been rendered,102 so it is undecided whether the State’s burden in an immunity
hearing is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is at trial, or whether it has a
lesser burden to overcome the defendant’s obligation to present proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Certainly, this is an important matter for the trial courts. Cases in which a
defendant seeks immunity based on self-defense under the Stand Your Ground
Law are usually factually complicated and disputed. State v. Gallo is a good
example.103
“Mr. Barbour’s unfortunate death resulted from events reminiscent of the
‘Shootout at OK Corral,’” the opinion begins.104 The appellate court recognized
that the trial judge conducted an evidentiary pretrial hearing, “made determinations
of credibility, weighed the numerous pieces of conflicting evidence, and set forth
extensive factual findings in a nine-page written order.”105 In affirming the granting
of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted:
The legislature’s enactment of section 776.032 placed the burden
of weighing the evidence in ‘Stand Your Ground’ cases squarely
upon the trial judge’s shoulders. In this case, that burden required
the trial judge to make order out of the chaos that occurred in
Sarasota on one fateful night in 2010.106
It is clear that a defendant who loses a pretrial motion to dismiss based on selfdefense immunity is not precluded from raising the issue at trial.107 In Tover v.
State, the court stated that the denial of the defendant’s pretrial motion was
“without prejudice to [the defendant] raising the Stand Your Ground statutory
________________________
99.
Id. at 341.
100.
Id. For an excellent analysis of the issue, see Associate Judge Schumann’s concurring opinion. He
notes that other states that have modeled their self-defense immunity statutes based on Florida’s have determined
that the burden of proof at the pretrial stage rests with the state to show that the use of force in self-defense was
unjustified. Id. at 342.
101.
Bretherick v. State, No. SC13–2312, 2014 WL 1659779, at *1 (Fla. 2014).
102.
Id. (On April 15, 2014 an opinion was rendered).
103.
State v. Gallo, 76 So. 3d 407, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
104.
Id. at 408.
105.
Id. at 409.
106.
Id. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Judge Salter’s dissenting opinion in Mobley v. State.
132 So. 3d 1160, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). Reasonable people considering the same facts can reach
different legal conclusions. See id. In Mr. Mobley’s case, Judge Salter in his dissent noted that four judges, hearing
the same almost-undisputed evidence, “split evenly” on whether Mr. Mobley met the requirements for Stand Your
Ground immunity from prosecution. Id.
107.
Tover v. State, 106 So. 3d 958, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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defense at trial.”108 Likewise, the court in Mederos v. State noted the difference
between a claim of immunity from prosecution and a self-defense claim at trial,
and held that the denial of the pretrial motion did not preclude the defendant from
submitting the matter to the jury as an affirmative defense.109
There are several lessons to be learned from these cases. It is prudent for a
defendant to file a motion to dismiss the criminal information based on self-defense
immunity at the earliest opportunity and request that the court set it for an
evidentiary hearing.110 The court should set aside ample time to conduct a full
evidentiary hearing, and then make appropriate findings to support its ruling. The
defendant should be prepared to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
immunity attaches.111 Until resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida, the State’s
burden of proof is unclear, and the State should be prepared to put on sufficient
evidence to overcome the defendant’s burden of proof. 112 Finally, should the
defendant fail to prove entitlement to immunity at a pretrial hearing, he or she
should prepare to assert and prove self-defense at trial.113
II. IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL ACTION
Although Stand Your Ground issues are more often encountered in the criminal
law arena, section 776.032 also grants self-defense immunity in civil actions.114 As
might be expected, there are few reported civil cases since the Law’s enactment.115
In Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, an altercation ensued after an argument over the
parking of a vehicle in a lot.116 The plaintiffs filed a civil suit against the defendant
for assault and battery. The defendant sought self-defense immunity from the
action.117 The trial court conducted a pretrial evidentiary hearing, and after
considering the testimony of several witnesses, found that the defendant was
entitled to immunity from the suit.118 The court thereupon dismissed the action with
prejudice.119
In another civil case, Professional Roofing and Sales, Inc. v. Flemmings, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for assault and battery, alleging that the defendant had
attacked him with a baseball bat at his place of employment.120 The plaintiff also
sued the alleged assailant’s employer on theories of vicarious liability for
negligence and negligent retention of a dangerous employee.121 The defendant filed
________________________
108.
Id.
109.
Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
110.
See Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
111.
See Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
112.
See Mederos, 102 So. 3d at 11.
113.
See Tover, 106 So. 3d at 959.
114.
FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014).
115.
See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Prof’l Roofing & Sales, Inc. v.
Flemmings, 138 So. 3d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
116.
Pages, 134 So. 3d at 537–38.
117.
Id. at 538.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So. 3d at 526.
121.
Id.
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a motion to dismiss the suit based on self-defense immunity, and the trial court
summarily denied the motion.122 The court also denied a subsequent similar motion
on the same grounds as successive, and suggested that it might be dealt with on a
summary judgment motion.123 Determining that a pretrial hearing was required, the
appellate court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
dismiss.124
In each of the foregoing cases, the defendant also faced criminal charges for
the same episode.125 In Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, the plaintiffs were husband and
wife.126 The defendant had been charged with felony battery for pushing the
husband to the ground, and misdemeanor battery for bumping into the wife.127
Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the defendant was adjudicated guilty of the
misdemeanor, and the State entered a nolle prosequi of the felony charge.128 The
defendant never sought immunity from prosecution based on the Stand Your
Ground Law in the criminal case.129
However, the defendant did so in Professional Roofing and Sales.130 In that
case, the State had charged the defendant with aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon because he struck the victim with a baseball bat.131 The defendant moved
to dismiss the criminal action asserting that he was immune from prosecution
because he used justifiable force to defend himself against the victim’s imminent
use of unlawful force.132 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the criminal
court agreed and dismissed the charges.133
In his motion to dismiss the civil suit, which was based on the same underlying
facts as the criminal action, the defendant argued that he was immune from the
civil action under the Stand Your Ground Law because, on the same facts, the
criminal court dismissed that action.134 This motion was summarily denied by the
civil court.135
The defendant made a compelling argument: the legal determination of
immunity under the Stand Your Ground Law should only have to be made once,
and under common law principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, immunity
should automatically apply in the subsequent civil case.136 After analyzing the
applicable law, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed.137
________________________
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Id. at 527.
125.
See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Prof’l Roofing & Sales,
138 So. 3d at 526.
126.
Pages, 134 So. 3d at 538.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
See id.
130.
Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So. 3d at 526.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So. 3d at 526.
137.
Id. at 527.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol20/iss1/1

10

Semento: Sorting Out the Shootout: Florida Courts Untangle the "Stand Your

Fall 2014

Sorting out the Shootout

11

Four elements are required for res judicata, or claim preclusion, to apply: (1)
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of
persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for or
against whom the claim is made.138 Collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion,
requires five elements: (1) the identical issues were presented in a prior proceeding;
(2) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior
proceeding; (3) the issues in the prior litigation were a critical and necessary part of
the prior determination; (4) the parties in the two proceeding were identical; and
(5) the issues were actually litigated in the prior proceeding.139
The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida found that the critical element
missing as to both of these doctrines is mutuality of the parties.140 Since the State of
Florida is a party in the criminal case and not in the civil case, each case involved
different parties.141 “We also do not find that the Florida legislature modified or
abrogated application of these common law doctrines when it conferred immunity
from both civil and criminal actions under the Stand Your Ground Law.”142 Thus, a
party seeking self-defense immunity in both a criminal and a civil case will likely
have to litigate the issue twice.143
The courts have treated claims of immunity from civil action similarly to those
seeking immunity from criminal prosecution.144 The defendant should promptly file
a motion to dismiss the action, and the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing.
If there was a preceding criminal action, a ruling on a motion to dismiss the
prosecution will be of no consequence in the civil action.
III. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY AND SELF-DEFENSE IMMUNITY
A significant issue addressed by the courts is whether someone involved in an
unlawful activity can obtain immunity under the Stand Your Ground Law.145 Since
the enactment of the Stand Your Ground Law in 2005, this has been a debated
topic in the appellate courts.146 Further complicating the issue, the Florida
Legislature recently amended the Stand Your Ground Law concerning the unlawful
activity issue.147
Section 776.032 provides immunity from prosecution or civil action for “[a]
person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or
s. 776.031 . . . .”148 In Brown v. State, the court explained:
________________________
138.
Id. (citing Topps v. State, 855 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004)).
139.
Id. (citing Porter v. Saddlebrook Resorts, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1212, 1214-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Prof’l Roofing and Sales, 138 So. 3d at 528.
143.
See id.
144.
See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So.
3d at 524.
145.
See Brown v. State, 135 So. 3d 1160, 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214,
216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Hill, 95 So. 3d 434, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
146.
See Brown, 135 So. 3d at 1161; Little, 111 So. 3d at 216; Hill, 95 So. 3d at 434.
147.
FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (amended 2014).
148.
FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014).
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As the first line in the statute clearly sets out, there are three
avenues by which a defendant’s use of force may qualify for the
statutory immunity from prosecution: that his or her use of force
was permitted by section 776.012; by section 776.013; or by
section 776.031. For all three avenues, the 2005
amendments/enactments abolished the duty to retreat if the other
statutory justifications for use of force, including deadly force,
were met. Of the three avenues for immunity, the use of force as
permitted in section 776.013 is the only avenue limited to persons
“not engaged in an unlawful activity.”149
In State v. Hill, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a
firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, together with other
charges.150 He filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated battery count asserting that
he was immune from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law.151 After
conducting an evidentiary hearing and finding that he qualified, the trial court
dismissed that charge.152
The appellate court, however, disagreed.153 Determining that it was previously
held that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is an “unlawful activity”
under the Stand Your Ground Law,154 the court decided that the defendant could
not obtain immunity by injuring his assailant with a firearm that he was not
lawfully allowed to possess.155 The opinion went on to note that it did not comment
on the defendant’s right to assert a justification defense.156 At least one other court
has held that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is an unlawful activity
under the Stand Your Ground Law.157
After the case was remanded to the trial court, Mr. Hill sought dismissal of the
charges because of his immunity under section 713.012 rather than section
713.013, as he had claimed before.158 The trial court, relying on the broad language
of the appellate court’s opinion, again denied the motion to dismiss, since Mr. Hill
was engaged in an unlawful activity.159 The appellate court found that Mr. Hill is
not precluded from claiming the justifiable use of force under section 776.012(1),
or from seeking immunity under section 776.032.160
________________________
149.
Brown, 135 So. 3d at 1161.
150.
Hill, 95 So. 3d at 434.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 435.
153.
Id.
154.
Id. (citing Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521, 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Although mentioned in the
context of immunity in Dorsey, the unlawful activity issue in that case actually dealt with the appropriate selfdefense jury instructions.)).
155.
Hill, 95 So. 3d at 435.
156.
Id.
157.
Darling v. State, 81 So. 3d 574, 578–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
158.
Hill v. State, 143 So. 3d 981, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
159.
Id.
160.
Id. at 983–87.
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The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida provided an in-depth analysis
of the issue in Little v. State, but reached a different result.161 Aaron Little and his
friend were walking toward Little’s girlfriend’s home when they encountered a
parked vehicle.162 Demond Brooks jumped from the back seat of the car.163 Little
knew Brooks, but they were not friends.164 Brooks suddenly pulled two handguns
from his waistband, pointed them at Little, and said he was “going to make it
rain.”165 Little ran behind his friend, and asked him to make Brooks stop.166 Little
then ran into the house.167 Brooks followed Little but stopped on the front steps.168
Brooks held the guns at his side and yelled for Little to come back out.169 Little,
who was frightened, pulled a handgun from his pocket and asked the homeowner to
“get” Brooks.170 She told Little to go outside because she did not want a gun in her
house.171 Her son, who was outside laughing with Brooks, came in and ordered
Little to leave.172
Seeing no back door, Little eased his way out the front door holding his gun
behind his back.173 He passed Brooks on the steps.174 Brooks made some
comments, and Little urged him to calm down.175 When Little was in the driveway,
Brooks pointed his guns at Little.176 Little raised his gun, closed his eyes, and fired
several shots.177 Brooks was hit and died.178 At the time of the incident, Little was a
convicted felon.179
In the criminal proceedings, Little filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that he
was immune from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law.180 In response,
the State asserted two arguments: “(1) Little was not acting in self-defense because
he reengaged Brooks after removing himself from the initial threat, and (2) Little
was not entitled to immunity . . . because he was engaged in an unlawful activity as
a felon in possession of a firearm.”181 After a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied
the motion on the first ground.182 The appellate court decided that the trial court
had erred in reaching that conclusion because Little’s use of deadly force was
________________________
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 219.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014

13

Barry Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1

14

Barry Law Review

Vol. 20, No. 1

justified under the circumstances.183 In the appeal, the State argued that the ruling
of the trial court should be upheld under the “tipsy coachman” theory;184 since
Little was engaged in an unlawful activity, he was not entitled to immunity in any
event.185
Construing section 776.032 to give effect to legislative intent, the court
concluded that the plain meaning of the statute is for it to provide immunity to a
person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or section 776.013(3); in
other words, each section was intended to provide a separate basis for immunity
under section 776.032(1).186
Thus, the court concluded that section 776.032(1) “provides for immunity from
criminal prosecution for persons using force as permitted in section 776.012,
section 776.013, or section 776.031.”187 Since Little was a felon in possession of a
firearm, he did not qualify for immunity under section 776.013.188 He did,
however, seek immunity for his use of force under section 776.012(1), and his
status as a felon in illegal possession of a handgun did not prohibit immunity under
that section.189
The Little court noted that it could not find any prior cases addressing this
issue, but it did consider State v. Hill, discussed above.190 In Hill, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal decided that the defendant’s use of force did not qualify
for immunity under section 776.013(3) because he was engaged in an unlawful
activity—possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.191 In Little, the Second
District Court of Appeal noted that the Fourth District did not address whether the
use of force by a person engaged in an illegal activity would qualify for immunity
from prosecution under section 776.012(1).192 The Second District certified a
conflict with the Fourth District as to this issue and went on to certify the following
________________________
183.
Id. at 218.
184.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 961 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The “tipsy
coachman” rule, which says that even if a trial court’s ruling is based on erroneous reasoning, the decision will be
upheld if there is any basis in the record which would support the judgment, comes to Florida from Georgia
through the
Supreme Court of Florida in Carraway v. Amour & Co. 156 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1963). “We are reminded of
Goldsmith’s [poem] RETALIATION:
‘The pupil of impulse, it forc’d him along,
His conduct still right, with his argument wrong;
Still aiming at honour, yet fearing to roam,
The coachman was tipsy, the chariot drove home.’”
Id. (citing Lee v. Porter, 63 Ga. 345, 346 (1879)).
185.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 218–19.
186.
Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
187.
Id. at 221–22.
188.
Id. at 222.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 222 (citing State v. Hill, 95 So. 3d 434, 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)). However,
as previously mentioned, the Fourth District is now in line with the Second District after the issue was again
considered in Hill v. State, 143 So. 3d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
192.
Id.
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question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance: “IS A
DEFENDANT WHO ESTABLISHES BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THAT HIS USE OF DEADLY FORCE IS PERMITTED IN
SECTION 776.012(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2009), ENTITLED TO
IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 776.032(1) EVEN THOUGH HE IS ENGAGED
IN AN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY AT THE TIME THAT HE USES THE
DEADLY FORCE?”193
As of the writing of this article, the Supreme Court of Florida has not taken
jurisdiction.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal again addressed this issue in State v.
Wonder.194 There, the defendant was charged with manslaughter for shooting an
individual at a post office.195 He moved to dismiss the information based on
immunity from prosecution under sections 776.032 and 776.012.196 After hearing
the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.197 The State requested the
trial judge to determine that the defendant was engaged in an illegal activity—
possession of a firearm on post office property.198 The trial court decided that it
was not an unlawful activity.199 When the defendant appealed the denial of his
motion, the State again raised the issue.200 The appellate court agreed with the
defendant that a determination of that issue was unnecessary because his motion
was filed under section 776.012, not section 776.013.201 The court in Wonder noted
that it had recently certified conflict with Little v. State202 on this issue and in dicta,
went on to say that it agreed with the analysis in Little.203
The issue of whether a person engaged in an unlawful activity can seek
immunity was also addressed in Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, the civil action discussed
above.204 The court found that even if the defendant’s guilty plea of misdemeanor
battery established as a matter of law that he was engaged in a criminal activity at
the time he used force, he sought immunity under both section 776.012 and section
776.013.205 The court recognized that a person must establish that he is not engaged
in an unlawful activity as a prerequisite to relief under section 776.013, but is not
required to do so when seeking immunity under section 776.012.206 Since the
defendant sought immunity under both sections, he was only prohibited from
________________________
193.
Id. at 222–23.
194.
State v. Wonder, 128 So. 3d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), overruled by State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–
4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014).
195.
Id. at 868.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
200.
Wonder, 128 So. 3d at 869.
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 869 n.2.
203.
See id. at 870.
204.
See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536, 539–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
205.
Id. at 539.
206.
Id.
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obtaining immunity under section 776.013 and could seek immunity under section
776.012.207
As mentioned supra, the Florida legislature made significant changes to the
Stand Your Ground Law as it pertains to immunity for those involved in unlawful
activities.208 Section 776.012 was amended by the inclusion of the following:
A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance
with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the
right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to
use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a
place where he or she has a right to be.209
Thus, as discussed in the foregoing cases, where there was no exclusion from
immunity for a person engaged in an unlawful activity under section 712.012, there
is now.210
Interestingly, section 776.013 was also amended.211 While section 776.013(3)
previously limited the use of force to those “not engaged in an unlawful activity,”
that language was deleted from the statute.212 As discusses in the cases above, that
was considered to be the only avenue available for immunity for one who was
engaged in an unlawful activity.
These amendments are discussed in both State v. Wonder213 and Hill v. State.214
The court in Hill notes that the legislature’s inclusion of that language supports its
conclusion that the statute did not intend to prohibit one engaged in an unlawful
activity from seeking immunity from prosecution under section 776.032 when
using justifiable force under section 776.012(1).215
These amendments to the Stand Your Ground Law are not likely to be applied
retroactively. The legislature did not make any clear statement as to the retroactive
or prospective application of the amendments.216 Thus, those who were engaged in
unlawful activities and seek immunity for incidents occurring prior to June 20,
2014 may receive different treatment from those whose incidents occurred
thereafter.
________________________
207.
See id. at 539–40.
208.
FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014).
209.
FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2013) (amended 2014).
210.
Id. The same change was made to FLA. STAT. § 776.031, with the same result.
211.
FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2013) (amended 2014).
212.
Id.
213.
State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13,
2014)..
214.
143 So. 3d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
215.
Id. at 986.
216.
“A general rule of statutory construction is that, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the
contrary, a law is presumed to act prospectively.” State v. Kelly, 588 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Two general exceptions apply: First, procedural statutes may be applied retroactively. Second, remedial statutes
may receive retroactive application. Id. Perhaps an argument may be made that the recent statutory changes are
remedial. Remedial statutes relate to remedies or modes of procedure, and do not create new or take away vested
rights. City of Lakeland v. Cantinella, 129 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1961). Given the treatment of these immunity issues
by the Florida courts of appeal, that argument seems unlikely to prevail.
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It will be interesting to see how the Supreme Court of Florida will address this
issue, if indeed it does so. Certainly, the approach taken by the Second District
Court of Appeal in Little v. State217 seems well-reasoned. It is based on sound
principles of statutory construction. The Third District, without mentioning Little,
used the same analysis and reached the same result.218 The Fourth District has also
acknowledged the soundness of that reasoning.219 Thus, it is likely that a person
engaged in an unlawful activity at the time of the use of force for an incident
occurring before the statutory amendments will be able to seek immunity from
criminal prosecution or civil action if that immunity is sought under section
776.012, but not under section 776.013.220 For an incident occurring after the
effective date of the amendments, the opposite result is likely. In either instance,
however, in filing a motion to dismiss, it is vital for a defendant to designate the
particular statute he or she is using as a basis for immunity.221
Although the issue has not yet been clarified by the Supreme Court of Florida,
the more persuasive authority demonstrates that a defendant who was involved in
an unlawful activity at the time of the use of force in self-defense may still seek
immunity from criminal prosecution or civil action, but only if he or she is not
disqualified by the statute under which the immunity is sought. In filing a motion
to dismiss, the defendant should clearly detail the particular statute that provides
the basis for the immunity. Finally, even if the defendant is precluded from
obtaining immunity because of an unlawful activity, the defendant may still assert
a justification defense at trial.
VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Another difficult issue confronting the courts since the enactment of the Stand
Your Ground Law concerns jury instructions. Prior self-defense jury instructions
include language concerning the duty to retreat.222 Since the duty to retreat was
virtually eliminated,223 the use of the outdated jury instructions is problematic.224
Instructing the jury on the duty to retreat for offenses that occur after the
effective date of the Stand Your Ground Law can be fundamental error, requiring
________________________
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 218–22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
See Pages, 134 So. 3d at 539–40.
See State v. Wonder, 128 So. 3d 867, 869–70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
See, e.g., Pages, 134 So. 3d at 539.
See Brown v. State, 135 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014),
In order to sufficiently raise a claim for immunity under section 776.032(1), the defendant
must identify the particular statutory basis or avenue (section 776.012; 776.013; 776.031; or
any combination thereof) upon which he or she relies to justify the force used. The potential
for confusion in the absence of such specification is illustrated by the certified conflict and
question of great public importance in the Second District’s Little decision and the conflict
with the Fourth District’s Hill decision certified in Bragdon v. State.

Id. (citation omitted). See generally Bragdon v. State, 123 So. 3d 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
222.
See, e.g., Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2000).
223.
See discussion, supra part I of this paper.
224.
See, e.g., Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2000).
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reversal.225 Even where defense counsel failed to object to the outdated duty to
retreat instruction, courts have found that the given instruction is an incorrect
statement of the law that negates the argument of self-defense, and is a
fundamental error requiring a reversal of the conviction.226
The standard jury instruction concerning the justifiable use of deadly force
applicable to criminal offenses occurring prior to October 1, 2005, the effective
date of the new Stand Your Ground Law,227 provided that
[t]he defendant cannot justify the use of force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm unless [he][she] used every reasonable
means within [his] [her] power and consistent with [his][her] own
safety to avoid the danger before resorting to that force.
The fact that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot
justify [his][her] use of force likely to cause death or great bodily
harm if by retreating [he][she] could have avoided the need to use
that force. However, if the defendant was placed in a position of
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it would have
increased [his] [her] own danger to retreat, then [his][her] use of
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was justifiable.228
After the enactment of the Stand Your Ground Law, the standard jury
instruction was modified, and in pertinent part now reads:
If the defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was
attacked in any place where [he][she] had a right to be, [he][she]
had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his][her] ground
and meet force with force, including deadly force, if [he][she]
reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death
or great bodily harm to [himself][herself] or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.229
In Floyd v. State, a fight broke out during a party at the defendant’s
residence.230 He armed himself with a rifle.231 A gunfight ensued, and the defendant
________________________
225.
See Williams v. State, 982 So. 2d 1190, 1193–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Despite the defense
attorney’s failure to object at trial, the court determined that the given instruction was an incorrect statement of the
law which negated the defendant’s only defense, and was thus a fundamental error requiring reversal of his
conviction. Id.
226.
See id.; see also Richards v. State, 39 So. 3d 431, 433–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). In determining
whether jury instructions constitute fundamental error, a court must consider “the effect of the erroneous
instruction in the context of the other instructions given, the evidence adduced in the case, and the arguments and
trial strategies of counsel.” Smith v. State, 76 So. 3d 379, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
227.
2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 436 (West).
228.
See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2000).
229.
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2006).
230.
Floyd v. State, No. 1D11–4465, 2014 WL 4197377, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2014).
231.
Id.
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shot someone in the back, killing him.232 The defendant asserted self-defense at
trial, but was convicted of second degree murder.233 He appealed.234 The appellate
court found that a conflicting jury instruction amounted to a fundamental error
requiring reversal of his conviction.235
Prior to deliberations, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction:
If the defendant was not engaged in any unlawful activity and
was attacked in any place where he had a right to be, he had no
duty to retreat and had the right to stand his ground and meet
force with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably
believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great
bodily harm to himself or another, or to prevent the commission of
a forceable [sic] felony.236
However, the use of deadly force is not justifiable if you find:
1. Robert Franklin Floyd initially provoked the use of force
against himself, unless [:]
A. The force asserted toward the Defendant was so great that he
reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to
escape the danger other than using deadly force.237
The defendant prevailed on his argument that one section of the jury
instruction negated the other.238 That constituted fundamental error, the court
concluded, and his conviction was reversed.239
An issue with the jury instructions arose in Dorsey v. State.240 There, a dispute
at a high school keg party escalated into a fight, resulting in the deaths of two
young men after being shot by the defendant.241 He was charged with two counts of
second degree murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and carrying a
concealed weapon.242 The defendant was tried and convicted of those charges.243
Although the defendant argued that the shooting was in self-defense, his
counsel requested that the court not give the Stand Your Ground instruction based
on section 776.013(3) because the defendant, a convicted felon, was engaged in an
________________________
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Floyd, 2014 WL 419377 at *2 (alterations in original).
Id. at *1 (alternations in original).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 522–23.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 522–23.
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unlawful activity—possession of a concealed firearm—at the time of the
incident.244 The trial court declined and stated its intent to include the standard
Stand Your Ground instruction.245 The defendant’s counsel then proposed that the
court give the following special instruction:
If you find that the defendant was engaging in an unlawful
activity or was attacked in a place where he did not have the right
to be then you must consider if the defendant had a duty to retreat.
If the defendant was placed in a position of imminent danger or
death or great bodily harm and it would have increased his own
danger to retreat then his use of force likely to cause death or
great bodily harm was justifiable.246
The emphasized portion of the requested instruction was taken from the pre2005 standard jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force. 247 The court
also declined to give that instruction.248 The defendant was subsequently found
guilty and convicted as charged.249
Noting that the courts in Williams v. State250 and Richards v. State251 found
fundamental error when the jury was charged with the pre-2005 instruction on the
justifiable use of deadly force after the enactment of section 776.013, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal distinguished those cases.252 Unlike those cases, there was
an issue in this case as to whether the defendant was involved in an unlawful
activity at the time of the incident.253 The court found that the current standard jury
instruction254 does not inform the jury of the scope of the duty to retreat in
circumstances where the person is engaged in an unlawful activity or is in a place
where he or she had no right to be at the time of the attack.255 The court went on to
say that since the plain language of section 776.013(3) provides that the “no duty to
retreat” rule applies only when one “is not engaged in an unlawful activity,” the
common law duty to retreat must still apply.256 Suggesting that the trial court could
have either not given the standard Stand Your Ground instruction, or given both
that instruction and the special instruction requested by the defendant, the court
reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.257
________________________
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 525–26 (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended 2014)).
Id. at 526.
Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526.
Id. (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2004)).
Id.
Id. at 523.
Williams v. State, 982 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Richards v. State, 39 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526–27.
Id.
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2011).
Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 527.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014)).
Id. at 527–28.
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The most recent case to consider this issue is Hardison v. State.258 There, the
defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and asserted at trial that
he used deadly force in self-defense.259 He was convicted of second-degree murder
and challenged his conviction, asserting on appeal that the trial court committed
fundamental error by using an improper jury instruction.260 The trial court gave not
only the current standard jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force, but
added a special instruction requested by defense counsel which informed the jury
that a convicted felon may lawfully possess a firearm in certain instances.261
The First District Court of Appeal provided a thoughtful analysis of the issue.
It considered two cases that dealt with immunity from prosecution—Little v.
State262 and State v. Wonder.263 Following the reasoning of those cases, the court
noted that there is a difference between the language of section 776.012(1) and
section 776.013(3):
Section 776.013(3) applies when a person is (1) not engaged in an
unlawful activity and (2) attacked outside the “castle” as long as
(3) he or she has a right to be there. A person who does not meet
these three requirements would look to section 776.012(1) to
determine whether the use of deadly force was justified. . . .
The requirements under sections 776.012(1) and 776.013(3) are
not identical. A person proceeding under section 776.013(3) would
have to prove that he or she reasonably believed the use of deadly
force was “necessary…to prevent death or great bodily harm…or
to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” Under section
776.012(1), a person would have to prove that he or she reasonably
believed the use of deadly force was “necessary to prevent

________________________
258.
Hardison v. State, 138 So. 3d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
259.
Id. at 1134.
260.
Id. at 1130.
261.
Id. at 1134 (citing Marrero v. State, 516 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). The instruction
given at the defense’s request stated:
However, in certain circumstances, a convicted felon may lawfully possess a firearm. Those
circumstances are, one, the felon must be in present, imminent and impending peril of death
or serious bodily injury, or reasonably believed himself or others to be in such danger; two,
the felon must not have intentionally or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it
was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct. Three, the felon must
not have any reasonable, legal alternative to possession [of] the firearm. Four, the firearm
must be made available to the felon without preconceived design. And, five, the felon must
give up possession of the firearm as soon as necessity or apparent necessity ends.
Id. This instruction is based on Marrero v. State, which sets forth the elements of the “necessity” or “justification
defense” against a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Marrero, 516 So. 2d at 1055.
262.
See Hardison, 138 So. 3d at 1133 (citing Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)).
263.
Id. at 1134 (citing State v. Wonder, 128 So. 3d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), overruled by State v.
Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014).
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imminent death or great bodily harm…or to prevent the imminent
commission of a forcible felony.”264
If the challenged instruction had not contained the portion requested by defense
counsel, the appellate court indicated that it would tend to agree with the defendant
and find fundamental error; however, when considered as a whole, the court found
that the jury was properly instructed on the justifiable use of deadly force.265 The
court did say that “[t]hese decisions suggest that Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f)
could stand revision to clarify the circumstances under which the use of deadly
force is justified. However, we make no such assertion today, and we decidedly do
not hold that standard instruction is fundamentally flawed.”266
Given the state of confusion involving proper jury instructions, particularly
when the defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity at the time, criminal courts
and counsel should exercise due care in charging the jury properly when Stand
Your Ground self-defense is asserted. The jury should not be instructed on a duty
to retreat if not required by the circumstances of the case. Trial courts should be
cautious in using pre-2005 standard jury instructions when the use of deadly force
in self-defense is an issue. Further, the current instructions should be modified.267
The courts should also exercise caution in the use of proper jury instructions when
a defendant is engaged in an unlawful activity at the time force was used in selfdefense.
V. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Another significant issue the courts have had to consider since the enactment
of the Stand Your Ground Law concerns the proper procedure for perfecting an
appeal.268 Clearly, and as discussed above, a defendant may challenge an order
denying a motion to dismiss based on immunity from criminal prosecution in a
direct appeal upon a conviction.269 However, challenges to these orders have also
been made by other methods.270
In Little v. State, the defendant sought review of an order denying his motion to
dismiss charges based on immunity by filing a petition for writ of certiorari.271 The
court treated the petition as a petition for writ of prohibition.272 The court
________________________
264.
Id. at 1133 (citing Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)) (alterations in
original).
265.
Id. at 1134–35.
266.
Id.
267.
The self-defense instructions 3.6(f) and (g) are currently under review by the Committee on Standard
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases.
268.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 216 n.1 (citing Montanez v. State, 24 So. 3d 799, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
269.
See, e.g., Montanez, 24 So. 3d at 801.
270.
See, e.g., Little, 111 So. 3d at 216 n.1.
271.
Id. at 216–17. A writ of certiorari under common law is a device by which an upper court can direct a
lower tribunal to send up the record of a pending case so that it may review it for regularity, and it is an
extraordinary remedy. Broward Cnty. v. G.B.V. Intern., Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. 2001).
272.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 216. A writ of prohibition is used to prevent a court from continuing to exercise
jurisdiction it does not have, or to prevent a court from assuming jurisdiction over a case in which it legally
cannot. A.D.W. v. State, 777 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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acknowledged that it had previously entertained these challenges by way of
petitions for certiorari, but it expressed concerns as to whether certiorari is the
proper method for review of these orders given the available remedy of review on
direct appeal of a subsequent conviction.273 Recognizing that the Supreme Court of
Florida has held that the appropriate method to review orders denying motions to
dismiss criminal prosecutions based on immunity claims is by prohibition, the
court concluded that “the better avenue for review is a petition for writ of
prohibition. . . .”274
Most of the Florida district courts now agree that a petition for writ of
prohibition is an appropriate method for obtaining review of a trial court’s denial of
a claim of immunity from prosecution.275 Further, if the appellate court has
reviewed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss by writ of prohibition, it is
precluded by res judicata from again reviewing the same issue on direct appeal
following a subsequent conviction.276
Although a defendant must appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss by a
petition for writ of prohibition, it appears that if the State wishes to challenge an
order on a motion to dismiss, it must do so by petition for writ of certiorari.277 In
Wonder v. State, the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari challenging the part of
a trial court order determining that the defendant was not involved in a unlawful
activity at the time of the shooting.278 The appellate court denied the petition, but
there was no indication in the opinion that the state had sought review by an
improper method.279
In Martinez v. State, the trial court refused to hold a pretrial hearing on the
defendant’s motion to dismiss asserting immunity from prosecution because there
was insufficient time prior to trial, and instead heard the motion during the trial.280
The defendant filed a petition for writ of mandamus,281 seeking to compel the trial
court to conduct a pretrial hearing.282 The appellate court agreed that the motion
must be heard prior to trial and granted the petition for writ of mandamus.283
In summary, if a trial court refuses to hear a motion to dismiss based on
immunity from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law, a petition for writ
________________________
273.
Little, 111 So. 3d at 216, n.1 (citing Montanez, 24 So. 3d at 801).
274.
Id. (citing Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1977)).
275.
See, e.g., Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Little, 111 So. 3d at 216 n.1;
Joseph v. State, 103 So. 3d 227, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Bretherick v. State, 135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Further, the standard of review by the appellate court is mixed: the trial court’s findings are
presumed correct and may only be reversed when not supported by competent substantial evidence, while the trial
court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Mobley v. State, 132 So. 3d 1160, 1161–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014).
276.
Rice v. State, 90 So. 3d 929, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
277.
State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
278.
State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13,
2014).
279.
Id.
280.
Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
281.
Id. A writ of mandamus is a common law writ used to compel the performance of an official duty
where an official has failed to undertake the duty. State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 150 So. 508, 511
(Fla. 1933).
282.
Martinez, 44 So. 3d at 1220.
283.
Id. at 1221.
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of mandamus is the appropriate method of review in the appellate court.284 If the
trial court hears and denies the motion, the proper remedy for the defendant is to
seek appellate review by a petition for writ of prohibition.285 If the State desires to
challenge such an order, it should do so by petition for writ of certiorari.286 Finally,
if a motion is denied and the defendant is convicted of the criminal charges, a
defendant may challenge the denial of the motion together with the conviction by
direct appeal.
CONCLUSION
Gabriel Mobley, introduced at the beginning of this article, traveled a different
course through the legal system than those arrested prior to the enactment of the
Stand Your Ground Law. As the case law demonstrates, the Stand Your Ground
cases are usually factually convoluted and often difficult to unravel.287 Law
enforcement officers and prosecutors are required to analyze the facts and make
arrests and charging decisions, while defense lawyers must review the facts and
make strategy decisions. Judges are required to consider the facts and make
significant decisions, while jurors must consider the facts to make ultimate
decisions. Overlying all of this is the law itself, and knowledge of the procedural
and substantive aspects of the Stand Your Ground Law is imperative for those
involved in making these decisions.
Since the enactment of the Stand Your Ground Law, the courts have addressed
areas of concern including the proper procedures for processing immunity claims
in both criminal and civil actions,288 the ability of one engaged in an unlawful
activity to seek immunity,289 appropriate self-defense jury instructions,290 and the
proper method to appeal immunity orders.291 This is a work in progress, and the
courts will continue to interpret the Stand Your Ground Law to provide those
decision makers with more certainty for the Law’s implementation and application.

________________________
284.
Id.
285.
See Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216
n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Joseph v. State, 103 So. 3d 227, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Bretherick v. State,
135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
286.
State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
287.
See, e.g., Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), overruled by State v. Egido, 113 So.
3d 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
288.
See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010); Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
289.
See, e.g., Brown v. State, 135 So. 3d 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Little, 111 So. 3d 214; State v.
Wonder, 28 So. 3d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), abrogated by State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559,
2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014).
290.
See, e.g., Floyd v. State, No. 1D11–4465, 2014 WL 4197377, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2014);
Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
291.
See, e.g., Little, 111 So. 3d 214; Wonder, 28 So. 3d 867, abrogated by Wonder, 2014 WL 3928449, at
*1; Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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